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THE BAYS' LEGAL FUND V BROWNER: SHOULD
THE COURTS ALLOW AN AGENCY'S POOR
TIMING TO IMPERIL ENDANGERED SPECIES?
Sally A. Williams-
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
recently approved the continuing construction of a $310 million tunnel
and sewage outfall project in Boston Harbor The court held that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), did not
violate the Endangered Species Act (ESA), by approving the construction
of the outfall tunnel.' The court specifically found that the evidence
failed to show any harm to endangered species, that the environmental
impact statements issued by the EPA were sufficient to establish
compliance with the requirements of the ESA, and that the ESA does not
require a biological opinion from the NMFS prior to the commencement
of any construction. Judge Mazzone was the presiding judge, having
overseen the outfall project since the court had ordered the cleanup of
Boston Harbor in 1985, pursuant to the Clean Water Act
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1995.
1. The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F.Supp. 102 (D. Mass. 1993).
2. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988). The Act requires that the
agencies ensure that construction is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence, nor
cause the destruction or modification of the habitat, of any species listed as endangered.
In addition to the court's finding that ESA had not been violated, it also held that the
above listed agencies had not violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act or the National
Environmental Policy Act. Allegations that these Acts had been violated were brought
by Greenworld, Inc. and Richard Stahon, both of whom joined the Bays' Legal Fund in
the action. These allegations were given minimal discussion by the court which focused
on the violations of the ESA. The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F.Supp. at 108.
3. Scott Allen, New Troublesfor Sewage Outfall Tunnel, BOSTON GLOBE, April 18,
1992, Metro/Region, at 1. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
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This case provides an example of the judicial confusion over the
relationship between the EPA in approving such projects and the NMFS
as the agency in charge of implementing the ESA.4 Judge Mazzone
found that halting construction while the NMFS completed its biological
opinion would be an "exaltation of form over substance."5 Clearly, his
position varies substantially from that of Judge Celebrezze, who wrote
the circuit court opinion in the famous case of Hill v. Tennessee Valley
Authority.6  In that case, the court stated that the procedural and
substantive requirements of the ESA should be enforced strictly because
an error on the side of permissiveness could possibly result in the
extinction of a species.7
The major substantive issue presented in this case is whether the
EPA has complied with the mandate of the ESA by allowing construction
to proceed without a final biological opinion from the Department of
Commerce. It is surprising that the Browner court believed that such
compliance was unnecessary when the consequences of proceeding in
such a manner are so significant. Vast public resources are invested in
these kinds of projects which require federal funding and approval.
These funds are at risk if a biological opinion is issued after the onset of
construction which requires the discontinuation of the project because it
would endanger the existence of a species In addition, an error in
4. Whenever a federal agency proposes to undertake an action that may affect an
endangered species, the agency must enter into a formal consultation with either the
Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of Interior, depending upon which species is
involved. In this case, the Secretary of Commerce had the responsibility for enforcing
the ESA, through the NMFS, the agency within the Department of Commerce that is
responsible for marine wildlife and habitat. If the endangered species is land-based, the
Department of Fish and Wildlife, within the Department of Interior is consulted. 16
U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
5. The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F.Supp. at 11.
6. 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
7. Id. at 1072. In Hill, the court stated that with such an error, "the most eloquent
argument would be of little consequence to an extinct species," distinguishing judicial
error in a NEPA case which is subject to later review and remedy before further damage
is done, and judicial error in an ESA case. This decision was upheld by the Supreme
Court. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 151 (1978).
8. In many instances, the proper remedy for a violation of a federal law is an
injunction. The Supreme Court has stated that "where the national policy objectives of
a statute have been frustrated, the standards of the public interest, not the requirements
of private litigation, measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief." Hecht v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944). See also Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Advance
Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972). In a case such as the present
one, the injunction could either close down the project permanently, as the Court did in
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judgment can be irreversible when dealing with a species that is already
at risk of extinction. In many cases there are no second chances.9
Therefore, the protections that Congress has given to endangered species,
through the procedures set forth in the Endangered Species Act, should
be strictly complied with, even when it appears that following such
procedure is merely exalting form over substance.
By focusing on the procedural and substantive requirements of the
ESA, and exploring the various judicial interpretations of those
requirements, this Note will explain why the Browner court erred in its
decision. It is imperative that the judicial system mandate strict
compliance with the ESAs interagency cooperation requirements. By
requiring federal agencies to cooperate under set procedures, Congress
affirmatively established a system of checks and balances, affording
endangered species the best possible protection. Strict compliance with
these procedures allows the nation to grow and develop with minimal
economic loss, while providing endangered species the protection that
scientific and technological advancements can offer.
II. Legal Background
The Endangered Species Act (Act) was passed in 1973 for the
purpose of providing a program for the conservation of endangered
species.0 The Act requires all federal agencies to take affirmative action
for the purpose of conserving endangered species, by utilizing their
authority to achieve the purpose of the Act." The section of the Act
relevant to this case involves the mandate for interagency cooperation. 12
That section requires each federal agency to consult with the Secretary
of the Department of Commerce or the Department of Interior13 before
Hill v. TVA, 437 U.S. at 195, or close down the project until the alternatives set by the
Department of Commerce or Department of Interior are complied with. See Pacific
Legal Foundation v. Watt, 539 F.Supp. 841 (D.C. Cal. 1982).
9. In Hill, the Secretary of Interior had determined that the operation of the dam
would result in the eradication of the snail darter. 437 U.S. at 173-74.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988).
11. 16U.S.C. § 1531(c) (1988). See also supra note 4. If the endangered species
is land-based, the Department of Interior is responsible, acting through the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service. If the endangered species is marine, the Department of Commerce is
responsible, with the National Marine Fisheries Service carrying out agency
consultations. .
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1988).
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taking any action that may "jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species ... or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of the habitat of such species." 4 During the consultation process, each
agency must use the "best scientific and commercial data available."' 5
If, after the consultation, the Secretary concludes that there is a possible
threat to any endangered species, the Secretary must provide the agency
with a biological opinion, specifying the impact on the species, and any
measures that the agency may take to minimize that impact.' 6
To comply with the requirements of the ESA, the agency must
initially request that the Secretary furnish information to it about the
existence of any endangered species that may inhabit the area of the
proposed action. If any such species is present, the agency must then
prepare a biological assessment. These steps must take place prior to the
commencement of construction. 7 After the agency initiates a con-
sultation, it may not "make any irreversible or irretrievable commitment
of resources ... which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or
implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures. "18
The Endangered Species Act merely outlines these procedures.
Regulations published in the Code of Federal Regulations provide more
guidance as to the proper procedure and substance of the Act."' The
regulations provide working definitions for both the biological assessment
prepared by the agency considering the action, and the biological opinion
prepared by the Secretary responsible under the ESA. ° The biological
assessment contains information concerning the endangered species and
its habitat, and evaluates potential effect or modification of the habitat."'
The biological opinion states the view of the responsible service as to
whether the proposed action will have the likely effect of jeopardizing the
continued existence of the species, or result in destruction or modifica-
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
15. Id.
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (1988). In its application, the Act, in using the term
"Secretary," is referring to the service within either the Department of Commerce or the
Department of Interior that is responsible for implementing the policies of the ESA. The
C.F.R. uses the term "Service" when discussing the consultation process. 50 C.F.R.
402.10 (1992).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1988).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1988).
19. 50 C.F.R. 402 (1992).
20. 50 C.F.R. 402.02 (1992).
21. Id.
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tion of the habitat.' The agency, which in this case would be the EPA,
provides the essential information from the best available scientific and
commercial data. The Secretary, which in this case would be the
NMFS, studies the EP~s assessment and then issues its opinion as to the
effect of the proposed action on the endangered species. The assessment
is for informational purposes, and the opinion is designed to interpret and
render an expert evaluation.
The federal regulations also help to explain what is required in the
consultation process. During the initial consultation, the agency must
request a list of any endangered species in the area of the proposed
action, and the appropriate service has 30 days to respond.' If the
service determines that a species is present, the agency must prepare the
biological assessment within 90 days.' The contents of the assessment
are at the discretion of the agency.' The service may use the biological
assessment in deciding whether or not they will request a formal con-
sultation, or may incorporate the data into their biological opinion.' The
formal consultation process ends when the service issues a biological
opinion.27
According to the regulations, the biological opinion shall include all
reasonable and prudent alternatives which are economically and
technologically feasible, if they would avoid the likelihood of jeopardiz-
ing the continued existence of an endangered species.' The opinion shall
also include any reasonable and prudent measures that may minimize the
impact of the action on any endangered species.29 If the agency adopts
the measures or alternatives offered by the service, it has fulfilled its
obligation under the ESA. If the agency fails to consider the measures
and alternatives and proceeds with the project, it runs the risk of being
challenged in court for noncompliance with the Act.3"
22. Id.
23. 50 C.F.R. 402.12(d) (1992).
24. Id.
25. 50 C.F.R. 402.12(t) (1992).
26. 50 C.F.R. 402.120)(2) (1992).
27. 50 C.F.R. 402.02 (1992).
28. 50 C.F.R. 402.14(g)(8) (1992).
29. Id.
30. See Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F.Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983). The
court found that the agency had not adopted the alternatives and measures proposed by
the NMFS, and that in failing to do, it was in violation of the ESA. Because the agency
had no justification for its failure to comply with the suggestions of the NMFS, the court
found that its action was arbitrary. The proper standard for judicial review of the
1994]
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Although the federal regulations offer some insight as to the exact
requirements of the Act, they may not be inclusive enough to avoid
substantial differences in statutory construction.3" Unfortunately, the
judicial response to the procedural ambiguities, in both the Act and
corresponding regulations, has been inconsistent. The courts have been
much more consistent when construing the substantive requirements of
the ESA.
The Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,32 secured
the priority of the provisions of the Endangered Species Act over all
other agency actions. The Court granted endangered species the "highest
of priorities," when it closed down the Tellico dam, after millions of
dollars had been invested and the project was virtually complete. The
Court stopped the project in order to save the snail darter, a small fish
that was unknown prior to the initial construction of the dam, but would
have been in danger of extinction had the dam been allowed to open. In
that case, the Court demonstrated a judicial commitment to enforcing
what it interpreted to be a Congressional mandate to protect endangered
species, regardless of economic consequences.33
The procedural requirements are concededly less than exact, but the
high priority given to endangered species is quite clear. Therefore,
judicial interpretations of procedure, when the Act and regulations are
ambiguous, should attempt to further the substantive requirement of
protecting the species. The Browner court failed to do this, and in doing
so, it passed over an opportunity to further the objectives of the Act. It
could have helped delimit the procedural boundaries of interagency
cooperation.
agency's actions is the arbitrary and capricious standard. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and
Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985).
31. In its criticism of the dissent's interpretation of the interagency cooperation
section of the Act, the majority quoted Lewis Carroll to describe the dissent's explanation
for the interpretation; "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a rather
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.'" TVA
v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173, n.18.
32. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 151 (1978).
33. Id. at 174. The Supreme Court noted that its view of the Act would produce
"results requiring the sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the project and of many
millions of dollars in public funds. But examination of the language, history, and
structure of the legislation under review here indicates beyond doubt that Congress
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities."
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Im. THE SUBJECT CASE
In 1985, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts ordered the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
(MWRA), to stop dumping sewage into Boston Harbor in violation of the
Clean Water Act.' The MWRA!s treatment plant at Deer Island had
been discharging approximately 40 tons of sludge into the outgoing tide
at the entrance to Boston Harbor each day for several decades." This
practice made Boston Harbor one of the dirtiest harbors in the nation.36
Pursuant to that decision, Boston has been engaged in designing,
funding, and constructing both new treatment facilities on Deer Island,
and an outfall tunnel with the capacity to take 500 million gallons of
treated effluent 9.5 miles out to sea each day.37 Due to the nature of the
ocean currents flowing north to south from Massachusetts Bay to Cape
Cod, the project will result in diverting the effluent from Boston Harbor
to waters off the Cape. In 1991, a Cape Cod organization called STOP
(Stop the Outfall Pipe), sent a petition to Governor Weld, urging him to
stop the construction until further studies and alternatives could be
researched. 8 STOP also advocated that the $310 million allocated for
the construction of the tunnel be used instead for state-of-the-art
secondary and tertiary treatment, so that the sewage would be clean
enough for discharge closer to Boston.39
By March, 1991, the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers had
given the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority the go-ahead for the
project, but the opposition on Cape Cod was just beginning to gather
strength. STOP enlisted the aid of U.S. Representative Gerry Studds,
then Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Fisheries and the
Environment, which has oversight authority over the Endangered Species
Act. Several endangered species inhabit the waters off the coast of
Massachusetts. Of these, the North Atlantic right whale is considered to
be in an extremely critical condition, with fewer than 350 still existing
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
35. Scott Allen, Boston Harbor's Waters Have Started to Heal; Cleanup Helping
to Shed Dirtiest Label, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1992, Metro/Region, at 1.
36. Id.
37. Jeff McLaughlin, Cape Fights Plan to Pipe Effluent Into Mass. Bay, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 18, 1991, Metro/Region, at 39.
38 Id.
39. Ross Gelbspan, Pressed by Cape Foes, MWRA to Study Sewage Tunnel Plan,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1991, Metro/Region, at 51.
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in the North Atlantic.4 Representative Studds responded by ordering the
EPA to meet the requirements of the Endangered Species Act, and
engage in a formal consultation with the National Marine Fisheries
Service in order to determine the impact of the project on the whales.41
Before Representative Studds became involved, the only consultation
the EPA had entered into with the NMFS was a preliminary one in 1988.
The NMFS responded to this consultation with a one page "tentative
conclusion" that the project would not significantly affect endangered
species.42 Although the EPA did not prepare a biological assessment
until 1993, it had prepared several environmental impact statements that
examined the potential impact of the project on endangered species.43
The formal consultation process, forced upon the EPA and the NMFS by
public and political pressure, finally commenced in 1992.
STOP and Cape Cod officials organized to form a legal defense fund
to raise money for what they believed was an inevitable lawsuit.' After
40. Dianne Dumanoski, Suit Aims to Halt Tunnel, Protect Whales in Bay, BOSTON
GLOBE, March 20, 1993, Metro/Region at 35. The North Atlantic right whales are
considered to be near extinction. The world's leading experts on the whales know that
only about 11 calves are produced each year. Recent molecular studies of the animals
indicate how close they are to extinction because all of the known whales can be traced
as descendants of only 3 females. Of the 300 to 350 in existence, 165 have been observ-
ed in the vicinity of Cape Cod between January and May. What scientists fear most is
that the Boston Harbor project will affect the food supply of the whales. As baleen
whales, they strain water through plates in their mouths, feeding on microscopic
plankton. The effluent that the tunnel will be discharging contains an abundance of
nitrogen and other nutrients that adversely affect plankton. See Jeff McLaughlin, U.S.
Studies Whether Whales Endangered by Harbor Pipe, BOSTON GLOBE, April 7, 1992,
Metro/Region, at 21.
41. McLaughlin, supra note 37.
42. The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F.Supp. at 106.
43. Id. at 113. In the opinion, Judge Mazzone found the environmental impact
statements to be voluminous and thorough enough on the topic of endangered species,
that they could serve as the EPA's biological assessment. Because the content of the
statement was sufficient, the judge decided that the EPA's intent was irrelevant, even
though they had not intended the environmental impact statements to serve as a biological
assessment. Id.
44. The Cape Cod group contended that the research by the EPA and NMFS, in
response to Representative Studds' requests, was being done merely to justify work that
was already underway, as it had been 4 years since the EPA had approved the tunnel.
The EPA claimed that the approval was merely to allow the construction of the tunnel,
and the MWRA would have to prove affirmatively that the effluent would not pollute or
harm endangered species before they would be allowed to discharge the treated sewage.
The group from Cape Cod questioned the EPA's commitment to the protection of
endangered species and the environment, and with good reason. One-hundred and ten
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exhausting administrative remedies, the Bays' Legal Fund (as the group
is now known) filed this suit in the U.S. district court, requesting an
injunction to stop the construction of the tunnel. They alleged that the
EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers authorized the construction
before the NMFS had initiated its federally-mandated studies on the
impact of the project on endangered species. As stated earlier, the court
held that none of the federal agencies involved had violated the
Endangered Species Act, either substantively or procedurally.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Endangered Species Act Requires a Formal Consultation
Resulting in a Biological Opinion Issued by NMFS
In denying the Bays' Legal Fund's request, Judge Mazzone stated
that the EPA was only required to issue a biological assessment before
construction of the project could begin.45 By looking at isolated sections
of the ESA and the corresponding federal regulations, as Judge Mazzone
did, this could appear to be the case.' However, the Act must be
viewed in its entirety to get a clear picture of what Congress intended
when it drafted the legislation. The Act clearly requires a formal
consultation with the NMFS, if the initial consultation finds that an
endangered species is present in the area of the proposed project.47
Various courts have determined that the ESA mandates this formal
procedure whenever an agency action may affect an endangered species.
million dollars had already been spent on the project and it was not unreasonable to
question the expenditure of these funds, especially if the EPA was not in fact fully
committed to allowing the project to become operational. Scott Allen, Outfall Pipe
Opponents Begin Legal Defense Fund, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 1992, Metro/Region,
at 27.
45. The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F.Supp. at 111.
46. Judge Mazzone was referring to 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c), which requires the
biological assessment to be complete before construction commences, and 50 C.F.R.
402.12 (1992), which states the same.
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a), (b).
1994]
132 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:123
For example, in Village of False Pass v. Wtt, 4 the court emphati-
cally stated that a formal consultation was a requirement of the Act. In
addition, the court stated that the service must prepare a biological
opinion outlining how the project will affect the species, including any
alternatives for avoiding adverse effects. Village of False Pass involved
oil and gas exploration leases on Alaska's outer continental shelf. The
Secretary of Interior had issued the leases without incorporating any of
the recommendations made by the NMFS in its biological opinion.
Interestingly, one of the endangered species involved was the North
Pacific right whale. The right whale, however, fared better in the
Alaska federal court than it did in the Massachusetts federal court. The
judge held that compliance with the Act required that the agency initiate
the formal consultation process, and not issue leases until the process was
complete.49 The court also found that this process was an affirmative
mandate of the Act, so that the biological opinion could be formed with
the best evidence available, including information developed during the
consultation.5" Because the opinion would contain alternatives developed
with this evidence, the agency should have incorporated these alternatives
into its plans, and its failure to do so warranted a finding that its actions
were arbitrary and capricious.5
Applying the court's reasoning in Village of False Pass to the subject
case, the NMFS was required, at the time the EPA initially requested
information on endangered species, to enter into the formal consultation
process. Neither the NMFS nor the EPA should have waited until public
48. 565 F.Supp. 1123, 1140 (D. Alaska 1983). In this particular case, the concern
was over the effect of three distinct hazards to whales from outer continental shelf
activities: 1) physical impacts caused by structures; 2) behavioral impacts caused by
noise; and 3) oil spills. As to the behavioral impact from noise, the biological opinion
stated that little was known about the impact on the whales from the low frequency
sounds associated with oil exploration, but that such noise was known to cause stress in
other marine mammals. The opinion concluded that the information was insufficient to
determine if the project would be "likely to jeopardize" the whales. The opinion then
offered alternatives to avoid potential stress from noise. One of these alternatives would
restrict drilling during the times that the whales are in the area. This is one of the
alternatives that the court decided should have been incorporated into the project. This
same issue was raised by Bays' Legal Fund in the subject case, but Judge Mazzone
dismissed this allegation out of hand because the noise from the tunnel boring machine
is "less powerful than the noise produced by diesel tugboats." The Bays' Legal Fund v.
Browner, 828 F.Supp. at 109-110.
49. Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F.Supp. at 1154.
50. Id. at 1155.
51. Id. at 1163.
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concern and political pressure forced them into the process. From the
outset, both were aware that endangered species were present in the area.
This consultation should have ended only after the biological opinion was
complete, not after the NMFS issued a preliminary one-page response.5 2
If the court in Village of False Pass held that failure to incorporate
alternatives contained in a biological opinion was an arbitrary and
capricious action, then acting before determining which, if any,
alternatives would be recommended in the biological opinion, must be
considered arbitrary and capricious.
In another case, Pacific Legal Foundation v. Witt, the court held that
because the EPA awarded a construction grant for a mechanical
composting demonstration project to the City of Los Angeles, without
complying with the formal consultation process required by the ESA, the
EPA was in violation of the ESA.53 The court enjoined the EPA from
awarding or releasing any further funds for the project until the ESA was
complied with. Judge Mazzone should also have enjoined the MWRA
from further construction until the biological opinion had been issued by
the NMFS. Even though the biological opinion was expected to be
released within two months of the decision, not enjoining the defendants
from further action set a bad precedent for future projects.
B. Project Construction Should Not Commence until
The NMFS Has Issued its Biological Opinion
The most significant problem with the ESA consultation process is
that the Act and the federal regulations are unclear as to when construc-
tion can commence. They distinctly require a biological assessment to
be issued prior to construction, and to state that the process ends with the
issuance of the biological opinion. However, they are unclear as to
52. In another ESA case, the court found that a letter from NMFS sufficed as a
proper biological opinion, but in that case the letter was intended to be a biological
opinion by the authoring agency. In an affidavit, the director of the NMFS stated that
the letter was so intended. The letter also referenced documents that formed the
biological assessment. The court found that the documents, taken together, were a
sufficient summary of the relevant data, "to satisfy the requirements of ESA." Hence,
the court was indirectly stating that the opinion was a necessary requirement of the Act.
See National Wildlife Federation v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In
the present case, there was no evidence that the NMFS intended its one-page letter to be
the final biological opinion. To the contrary, its intent was evidenced later when it
responded to public demand, and began preparation for an actual biological opinion.
53. 539 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
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whether construction can begin prior to the issuance of the biological
opinion. Judge Mazzone found that this was not a procedural require-
ment of the ESA.54 Other courts, however, have placed a greater
emphasis on the importance of the biological opinion.
For example, in Conservation Law Foundation v. Wtt, the court
stated that not only should a project for exploration of oil and gas on the
outer continental shelf await the biological opinion prior to commence-
ment of construction, but that if the opinion, once issued, required
further studies in the immediate future, the project should await the
results of those studies before it commenced.' In Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, the court reviewed the interagency cooperation requirements
of the ESA when deciding whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
had violated the Act by issuing permits for the construction of a dam.56
The court found that the Corps' actions were not arbitrary and capricious
in disregarding the recommendations of the Department of Interior,
although they did offer a discussion of the formal consultation process.
Specifically, the court acknowledged the requirement of the consultation
process and implicitly stated that the biological opinion was a necessary
element.5 7
The purpose of the consultation is clear. The EPA is to consult with
the NMFS in order to receive an expert opinion concerning the effect of
the project on the endangered species. It would seem contradictory to
the purpose of the consultation requirement to require the EPA to wait
until the NMFS issued a biological assessment before it commences
construction, but not require it to wait until the biological opinion has
been issued. The purpose of the assessment is to provide the scientific
and commercial data to the NMFS in order for it to form the best
possible opinion. In its opinion, the NMFS introduces possible
alternatives or modifications to reduce any adverse impact on the species.
The agency is then required to consider the alternatives. The agency is
not required to adopt the alternatives in the biological opinion, although
54. The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F.Supp. at 112.
55. 560 F.Supp. 561, 573 (D. Mass. 1983).
56. 534 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1976).
57. Id. at 1305. In that case, the court quoted a discussion between Senators
recorded in the legislative history of the Act. One Senator stated that the agencies "have
to consult with the respective agencies," rather than making the decision on their own.
Id. at 1304 (quoting 119 CONG. REc. 25688-89 (1973) (discussion between Sen. Tunney
and Sen. Cook)). The court found that the Corps had fulfilled its requirement under the
ESA by completing the consultation, and by waiting for the opinion of the Department
of Interior to issue its opinion.
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great weight is placed upon such adoption when the actions of the agency
are reviewed.5
It is interesting to note that the above mentioned case, Conservation
Law Foundation v. Wtt, was decided by Judge Mazzone himself, ten
years prior to the subject case. In that opinion he stated that when
studies commissioned by the Department of Interior were on-going, an
agency should not proceed without the studies being completed if an
endangered species was potentially threatened. 9 In that case, Judge
Mazzone was dealing with a situation where the biological opinion had
been issued. The opinion stated that the impact of oil and natural gas
exploration on the outer continental shelf could not be determined, and
ordered further studies. Judge Mazzone was clearly advocating
adherence to the language and legislative history of the Endangered
Species Act by giving priority to the endangered species over the mission
of the federal agency, regardless of the cost.'
The only input from the NMFS that occurred during the consultation
process in the subject case was the one-page preliminary statement.
Surely, this cannot substitute for the complete and well-informed
biological opinion that Congress had in mind when it enacted the
Endangered Species Act.6" The NMFS did not offer any possible
alternatives to the project, nor did it discuss any of the relevant studies
58. See National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 359 F.2d 350, 371 (5th Cir.
1976), where the court stated that the Act does not give the Department of Interior veto
power over the actions of other federal agencies, but that the agencies' decisions are
subject to judicial review as to whether they considered all relevant factors.
59. Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt, 560 F.Supp. at 573.
60. One can only wonder why Judge Mazzone's position in the subject case is so
substantially different from his prior decision, as only a minimal amount of funds had
been invested when the action was brought before the court. In the subject case, $148
million had already been spent by the time the court heard the case. Although Judge
Mazzone stated that this fact should not be weighed against the interest of preserving an
endangered species, it is interesting that he felt compelled to note the amount of this
investment and the cost of terminating the project. The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner,
828 F.Supp. at 112.
61. Although the contents of the biological assessment are at the discretion of the
agency, the regulations provide some suggestions for inclusion: 1) the results of an on-
site inspection of the area affected by the action to determine if listed or proposed species
are present or occur seasonally, 2) the views of recognized experts on the species at
issue, 3) a review of the literature and other information, 4) an analysis of the effects of
the action on the species and habitat, including consideration of cumulative effects, and
the results of any related studies, and 5) an analysis of alternate actions considered by
the federal agency for the proposed action. 50 C.F.R. 402.12 (1992).
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available. This failure clearly violated the requirement of using the best
scientific and commercial data available.
C. Witing for the Biological Opinion Protects
Against Economic Loss
As noted earlier, courts have adhered to the substantive requirements
of the Act, without regard to any economic loss that may result.62 The
Act provides, as a preventive measure against economic loss, a provision
that prohibits any "irretrievable commitment of resources with respect to
the agency action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or
implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative measure .... "
during the consultation process.63 Judge Mazzone contends that this
section of the Act does not prohibit the commitment of all resources,
only those that have the effect of foreclosing alternatives.' 4 If this phrase
in the Act is to be given the very narrow interpretation of Judge
Mazzone, then one can imagine that millions of dollars could be wasted,
especially if projects are allowed to commence without the completion of
the consultation process, and the biological opinion later states that the
project will adversely affect an endangered species. The project could
be shut down with large amounts of capital investment being wasted.'
Inevitably, courts would be forced to choose between violations of the
Act and economic loss.
Unfortunately, other courts have taken the same position as Judge
Mazzone on this issue. In several federal court decisions, the agencies
that proceeded with a project, investing substantial funds prior to
completion of the consultation process, were held to be in compliance
with the Act.' But it is important to note that in each of these cases, the
court was faced with the issuance of leases for oil or gas exploration on
the outer continental shelf, and as one court stated, "the oil companies
are prepared for the risk of losing these resources which are at stake. "67
It appears to make a difference that the risk of loss falls upon private
62. See also Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1072 (6th Cir. 1977), where the court
stated that "the ongoing nature of a project does not preclude enforcement of § 1536."
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1988).
64. The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F.Supp. at 112.
65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
66. See Village of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F.Supp. at 1163; Conservation Law
Foundation v. Watt, 623 F.2d at 715; and National Wildlife Federation v. Andrus, 642
F.2d at 589.
67. Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt, 623 F.2d at 715.
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investors rather than the public. If this is so, then Judge Mazzone should
have been more concerned with the potential loss to the taxpayers and
customers of the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority.6"
In the subject case, the court noted that the termination of the project
would cost an additional $48 million. The time for the recognition of
potential loss, however, is prior to any major investment, not after the
project is underway.69 It simply makes no sense to show concern for
losses that would be suffered upon termination of a project, when all
losses could be avoided simply by adhering to the procedural and
substantive requirements of the Act before any major investment is made.
By ignoring this aspect of the EPPs actions, the court was encouraging
the commitment of substantial resources in future projects, without the
assurance that the Endangered Species Act will not be violated.
The plaintiffs in this case contend that the $148 million already spent
on the project in itself has the "effect of foreclosing" alternative
discharge possibilities.' Judge Mazzone found that such a "rigid
construction" of the Act was not justified, and that the statute calls for
some judicial discretion to determine whether the commitment of
resources has that effect.7 One must ask, then, how much money would
have to be spent before this judge, within his judicial discretion, would
determine that alternative possibilities had been effectively foreclosed?
It is completely reasonable to conclude that at some point, the magnitude
of the investment would lead to agency decisions that are tainted by the
potential economic loss. Even if this does not occur, public funds are at
risk if alternative actions are forced upon a project at a date late in the
68. In this case, not only was the $148 million at risk, but the residents of the city
of Boston and surrounding suburbs were already experiencing rate increases for their
water and sewage service, paying an average of $535 annually. Federal funding accounts
for only 4% of the total cost of the project, so the balance will be paid by homeowners.
Their rates are projected to increase to an average of $855 by 1998. Elizabeth Ross,
Boston Harbor Goes Clean, THE CnUSTAN SCIENCEMoNrrOR, Sept. 10, 1992, Habitat,
at 10. Obviously, the residents of the Boston area will be paying the cost of the tunnel
project for years to come, regardless of whether it becomes operational.
69. The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F.Supp. at 112, n.22.
70. Id. at 112. The plaintiffs argued: "The practical effect of any commitment
of money is to build momentum. The more money spent on any single option ... the less
likely it is that alternatives will be chosen. No single dollar ... commits completely, but
complete foreclosure is not the statutory test, if an action 'has the effect of foreclosing'
it meets the test..." Id. at n.24.
71. Id.
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construction process.' A broader interpretation of the Act's require-
ment, as proposed by the plaintiffs in The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner,
would afford the public the protection that they deserve.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two months after the decision in this case, the NMFS finally issued
its long-awaited biological opinion. The NMFS agreed with the EPMs
analysis that the existence of any endangered species would not be
jeopardized by the project. 3 However, hindsight should not be used to
justify the decision in this case. The opinion could have stated that the
project would jeopardize the continued existence of the right whale, or
adversely modify its habitat. Alternatively, the opinion could have
recommended costly alternatives for the disposal of the effluent. With
either hypothetical situation, the deciding court would have to choose
between enforcement of the ESA, and waste or increase of public funds
on the project. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the mandate of the ESA takes priority in such a case.74
72. The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F.Supp. at 112-113, for a discussion
of alternatives. Judge Mazzone stated that the current investment in the project ($148
million) did not preclude the development of reasonable and prudent alternatives. Except
for the alternative that the discharge be reduced during periods when the risk to the
species was the greatest, each of the alternatives he discussed required additional funding
or wasting funds already committed to the project. For example, he found that the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority could use the existing outfalls at Deer Island,
but that would waste the investment in the outfalls. The judge also discussed the
possibility that the discharge could be delayed until the treatment facilities had the
secondary system or even additional treatment operational. But this alternative would
impose an additional cost to the public, whereas, if explored prior to commencement of
the outfall construction, the facilities could have possibly been constructed without further
cost. This alternative was proposed by STOP, early in the development of the project.
Id.
73. Dolores Kong, Sewage Outfall Tunnel Gets O.K.; Agency Downplays Danger
to Whales, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 1993, Metro/Region, at 30. The final biological
opinion stated that the tunnel may affect endangered species like the right whale, but is
"unlikely to jeopardize their existence." One of the authors of the opinion stated that in
NMFS' view the whales were already feeling the effects of the partially treated sewage
that is flowing into Boston Harbor, and that sending the effluent out to sea probably
would not make matters any worse. The opinion did propose recommendations for
monitoring the effects of the project on the species, and if such monitoring shows any
harm, the service could call for changes in the project.
74. Hill v. TVA, 437 U.S. at 174.
The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner
Not only did the court set a bad precedent with its decision, but it
gave up the opportunity to impose binding commitments upon the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority. 5 If the court had insisted
upon the issuance of the biological opinion as mandated by the ESA, and
halted any further construction, it would have been in the position to
enforce judicially the monitoring recommendations that the NMFS
included in the opinion.76
The biological opinion was somewhat disconcerting, in that the
NMFS seemed to take the approach that the whales, while no better off,
would not be any worse off than they had previously been.' The service
also missed an opportunity to provide alternatives that could have forced
the Massachusetts Water Resource Authority to include secondary
treatment as a prerequisite to disposing the effluent through the new
tunnel.78 The NMFS would be hard pressed to deny that the endangered
species would be better off if the effluent were subject to secondary, and
possibly tertiary treatments.
The Massachusetts Water Resource Authority was under a court
order to clean up Boston Harbor. The NMFS and the EPA were in a
position to ensure that whatever project was proffered in response to the
court's mandate would result in the cleanest harbor that Boston could
possibly enjoy. The district court was in a position to require the
agencies to act in a more effective and responsible manner. Unfortu-
75. Representative Studds had been advocating judicial enforcement of some kind
of monitoring since 1991. He stated that the court should place legally binding
commitments for "stringent monitoring of this project all over the bays, and more than
that, legally binding commitments that if any problems with nutrient loading or toxicity
are uncovered, action must be taken immediately-not after litigation or lengthy
adjudicatory hearing, but immediately." His position was, "no binding language, then
no permit to operate the thing." Jeff McLaughlin, Cape Fights Plan to Pipe Effluent Into
Mass. Bay, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 1991, Metro/Region, at 39.
76. Kong, supra note 75, at 30.
77. Id.
78. See supra note 74, for Judge Mazzone's discussion of alternatives. There were
alternatives other than those noted by Judge Mazzone. For example, a report published
by the Pioneer Institute of Public Policy Research in Boston, offered an alternative that
could potentially have saved $200 million. The report was coauthored by Donald
Harlemann, an engineering professor at MIT. The report discussed two new treatment
methods that have been used in California and other states. One method would
dramatically improve the treatment facility's ability to handle the sewage by adding
chemicals and polymers to the waste water. The other method, biological aerated
filtration, uses less space, and could be used if tertiary treatment was required in the
project. Jordana Hart, Report Urges Recasting of Sewage Plan; Group Says Alternatives
Could Save $200 m, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 1993, Metro/Region, at 13.
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nately, the EPA, the NMFS and the court all missed the chance to
improve the environmental outcome of the project.
